

David Hoffman

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PM

To: Bill Jefferson/Juno/Nuclear/FplNuc@FPLNuc, Michael W.
Kiley/Ptn/Nuclear/FplNuc@FPLNUC, Richard V Wright/Ptn/Nuclear/FplNuc@FPLNUC
cc: David Hoffman/Ptn/Nuclear/FplNuc@FplNuc
Subject: Resignation

I have a challenge in my ability to continue to be the senior license holder at Turkey Point. I previously informed you of some challenges regarding my ability to perform my job. Since that notification on 02/04 I have observed the following:

- The EDG overhaul scope was reduced without any input from myself or the Juno System Engineers for the EDG's - this included some corrective maintenance for the silencers and radiators
- The Outage valve scope was reduced without any feedback on the list of concerns I provided for the scope deferrals. These deferrals include items that are directed by commitments and corrective actions.
- The RPI failures continue to occur at an unacceptable rate and the cause is not fully understood - this resulted in an RPI not indicating correctly today during the trip.
- Overtime management (\$\$\$) is becoming more of a concern than doing the right thing for the plant again.
- An inaccurate pay code (deliberate action) was not corrected when challenged for an employee even when requested of HR
- The Operations continuing Training lunch has been removed from my interaction time with the crew to allow others time to meet with the crew without my knowledge or consent.
- Direction was given to allow work on a protected train piece of equipment without the Shift Managers or my permission.
- I have not heard the SVP acknowledge my previous letter for issues challenging my ability to perform my job as the senior license holder of PTN
- The additional equipment issues identified by the Operating crews today after the trip was not valued as input to improve equipment reliability and reduce the burden on the Operators; it was instead seen as an impediment to returning the unit to service
- The moral in the Operations department (PGM identified as the focus area as well as staffing) was devastated with the horrible management of the local agreement which was fully understood by some to be based on not using AREVA for fuel moving equipment reliability and reduce the burden on the Operators; it was instead seen as an impediment to returning the unit to service
- The moral in the Operations department (PGM identified as the focus area as well as staffing) was devastated with the horrible management of the local agreement which was fully understood by some to be based on not using AREVA for fuel moving. This issue took 5 days to actually agree to comply with what was negotiated.
- There is more focus on attempting to justify why the Steam Dump to Atmosphere valves are acceptable than to perform an inspection and validate why the valves did not operate as designed.

The dual unit trip today provided me with an opportunity to see how the entire organization functioned. I was basically told to step out of my oversight role in the Control Room on a few occasions to address CNO and COO questions that should not have been requested at that time since the units were not fully stabilized. I then saw additional resources arrive from Juno and begin to establish a Command and Control structure at the site. This structure does not allow for the Shift Manager to maintain oversight and provide guidance to the site for required repairs. This structure is more concerned about schedule adherence and development than actually fixing the plant and allowing deliberate actions to occur. The direction became very clear today when I was told when we were going to start up Unit 4 Reactor at 02:00. This was challenged but the challenge fell on deaf ears. When the challenge came to inquiring how the 02:00 time was determined for the Reactor Start up the answer was 12 hours is adequate time to recover a tripped Reactor. The problem with this mindset is the actual required scope of work was not understood when this time was established. The direction then became clear again to get everything fixed prior to 02:00 to support this time. The other significant challenge with a start up 12 hours after a trip is the status of Xenon. The Operating crews should never be placed in a position to get the reactor start up completed under a time pressure condition which exists to meet the 1/M plotting requirements for the third doubling with the rapidly changing Xenon conditions. This lack of desire to listen and act on input continues to force written correspondence and is the major contributor to why we have a SCWE issue at the station. People are not valued and are treated like equipment and numbers.

These issues show a clear bias to production over safety and a lack of desire for doing the correct repairs to return a Nuclear Unit to service. These items as well as the previous correspondence make it so I can no longer be the senior license holder for the station. I have enjoyed the majority of my time at the site and have learned a tremendous amount while working for FPL, for that I thank you. I am terminating my role as defined in Technical Specifications and the CFR immediately as well as my employment with FPL. I wish you all well. I do not have a job but I am sure my wife and I will enjoy getting to know each other again after the last 5 years of getting run hard and then harder.

Respectfully,

David Hoffman

Exhibit A