



**S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20331030**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

30 October 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000063DP (S)

### **JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment**

#### **1. (S//NF) Personal Information:**

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Maad al-Qahtani
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Muhammad Mani Ahmad al-Shaalan al-Qahtani, Abd al-Rahman al-Janubi, Abu Ahmad al-Janubi, Muhammad Bin Maneh
- Place of Birth: Kharj, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 19 November 1975
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000063DP



**2. (U//FOUO) Health:** Detainee is in good health.

#### **3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:**

**a. (S) Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for CD on 29 October 2007.

**b. (S//NF) Executive Summary:** *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would probably seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities at home and abroad. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has been mostly compliant with guard force personnel, but has attempted to assault guards or verbalized threats and other hostile acts on several occasions. He has admitted using a*

**CLASSIFIED BY:** MULTIPLE SOURCES  
**REASON:** E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)  
**DECLASSIFY ON:** 20331030

**S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20331030**

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000063DP (S)

*cover story and continues to withhold information of intelligence value.* Detainee is an admitted member of al-Qaida. Detainee was an intended “20th Hijacker” for the 11 September 2001 attacks, but failed to gain entry into the US to complete his mission. Usama Bin Laden (UBL) personally chose detainee for the terrorist operation after detainee swore *bayat* (oath of loyalty) to UBL. Detainee is associated with other key al-Qaida members including senior operations planners Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), aka (Mukhtar), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024); Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash, aka (Silver), ISN US9YM-010014DP (YM-10014); senior al-Qaida financial manager Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, ISN US9SA-010011DP (SA-10011); and military operations supreme commander Muhammad Salah al-Din Abd al-Halim Zaydan, aka (Sayf al-Adl). Detainee traveled to Afghanistan (AF) multiple times, received basic and advanced terrorist training, and participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) **Summary of Changes:** There are no significant changes to detainee’s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation.

#### **4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events:**

**The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.**

a. (S//NF) **Prior History:** Detainee has provided several versions of his cover story to interrogators. The following synopsis is assessed to be the most accurate reflection of his background.<sup>1</sup>

(S//NF) Detainee attended a Koranic studies institute for six years in Saudi Arabia, receiving the equivalent of a high school education. For the next five years he lived at home and was unemployed. Detainee attended an agricultural institute, but never graduated due to poor grades. He then held a series of odd jobs during which he attended night school and graduated with a certificate in computer applications. Detainee then moved to the United Arab Emirates (AE) where he performed menial jobs for the next two years.<sup>2</sup> Upon returning to Saudi Arabia from the United Arab Emirates, detainee experienced periods of unemployment. After quitting a job as a security guard, detainee received assistance from his

---

<sup>1</sup> IIR 6 034 0752 03

<sup>2</sup> IIR 4 201 2568 04, 000063 SIR 23-Apr-2003, 000063 SIR 02-May-2003

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000063DP (S)

cousin, Muhammad Saad al-Qahtani, to open a contracting company in Riyadh, SA. The contracting company obtained official Saudi work visas for foreign nationals and matched foreign guest workers to employers. After obtaining the work visas, the company sold the visas to companies sponsoring foreign nationals. Detainee worked in this company for approximately seven months.<sup>3</sup> Detainee left the contracting company and worked for approximately one year as an ambulance driver for a military hospital in al-Kharj. While working as an ambulance driver, detainee underwent the Islamic practice of *Iltizam* (embracing Islam in purist form) in approximately mid-July 2000. Detainee then traveled to Mecca for *umra* (the “minor” non-compulsory pilgrimage for Muslims) and upon returning, found another job as a laborer for al-Arjani Electrical Company. Detainee left this job after a few months to participate in militant Islamic combat in Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup>

**b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Travel:** In mid-2000 to early 2001, detainee was exposed to *fatwas* (religious edicts) and sermons regarding jihad through the news, his friends and the local mosques. Detainee believed his friends, who had returned from combat against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, had secured their place in heaven as fighters. Influenced by Shaykh bin Agala’s *fatwa* calling for Muslims to go to Afghanistan to fight,<sup>5</sup> detainee approached Hamdan al-Anazi, the imam at a local mosque, regarding his decision to fight. Hamdan al-Anazi, who regularly preached about jihad, introduced detainee to Abu Ubaydah al-Anazi, and Handala, who also wished to fight.<sup>6</sup> Detainee and Abu Ubaydah were then introduced to Shaykh Mohams and Shaykh Abu Omar who directed them to Shaykh Salih al-Fozhzani.<sup>7</sup> Al-Fozhzani was responsible for sending people for combat and provided the pair with contact information for a facilitator named Khalid who was in Syria (SY). Detainee and Abu Ubaydah traveled to Damascus, SY where they met with Khalid during Ramadan 2000.<sup>8</sup> The group flew from Damascus to Tehran, Iran (IR). The following day they began traveling to the Afghan border and continued on to Kandahar, AF where they stayed at the Hajji

<sup>3</sup> 000063 SIR 30-APR-2003, Analyst Note: Detainee’s experience could be used to assist him in obtaining visas for himself or other extremists. However, KU-10024 noted he had to inform the detainee of the process for obtaining a visa, casting doubt on detainee’s claims for this period.

<sup>4</sup> IIR 4 201 2568 04, 000063 SIR 30-APR-2003, Analyst Note: For additional information see TD-314/50461-03, IIR 6 034 0756 03, IIR 6 034 0476 03, and 000063 SIR 20-MAY-2003. Detainee described *Iltizam* as a process of discarding all non-Islamic influences in one’s personal life and truly embracing Islam in its purest form.

<sup>5</sup> >IIR 034 0755 03, IIR 6 034 1200 03

<sup>6</sup> Analyst Note: Variants of Ubaydah include Obeida and Obaida. Detainee has provided conflicting information which makes positive identification difficult as he has identified Faisal al-Anazi and Muhammad al-Anazi as his companions in varying stories with differing aliases. Handala is assessed to be Faisal Muhammad al-Anazi aka Khalf al-Anzi. Abu Ubaydah is believed to be aka Muhammad al-Anazi. See also 000063 EXT SIR 22-APR-2004, 000063 SIR 11-Apr-2003, and 000063 Handnote 31-Dec-2001 for example reporting with the aliases.

<sup>7</sup> Analyst Note: Shaykh Mohams is aka (Mehmas al-Dosri). Shaykh al-Fozhzani is aka (al-Fowzan).

<sup>8</sup> TD-314/50461-03, IIR 4 201 2568 04, Analyst Note: Ramadan 2000 occurred from 28 November to 27 December 2000, although detainee estimated he left for training-jihad in spring 2001. Shaykh bin Agala is assessed to be radical Shaykh Hamud Bin Uqla al-Shuabi

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000063DP (S)

Habash Guesthouse.<sup>9</sup> Detainee informed the director of the guesthouse of his desire to receive training. The director registered detainee and his friends' names and took their passports and money and put it in the safe. Three days later, detainee traveled to the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp.<sup>10</sup>

**c. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** Detainee's training and activities cover three periods: basic and advanced training, his al-Qaida mission to the US, and events leading to his capture.

(S//NF) Detainee attended basic training at the al-Faruq Training Camp in late 2000. Detainee's training included marksmanship, weapon maintenance, leadership, survival training, terrain negotiation, resisting hunger and the care of injured or killed comrades. Detainee spent about three months in basic training from December 2000 to February 2001.<sup>11</sup> Detainee then returned to the Hajji Habash Guesthouse in Kandahar where he remained for approximately two months. During this time, al-Qaida operative al-Zubayr introduced detainee to UBL. Detainee stated UBL told him that since he (detainee) loved to serve his religion, he must go to KU-10024, who will ask him to "do things."<sup>12</sup>

(S//NF) After completion of his basic training, detainee traveled to UBL's house in Kandahar and swore *bayat* to UBL.<sup>13</sup> Detainee then received two months (approximately 19 February 2001 to 27 April 2001) of advanced training with about 30 other students at Tarnak Farm, aka (Abu Ubaydah Training Camp), located outside of Kandahar. Training included urban warfare and weapons firing from moving vehicles and while advancing on foot.<sup>14</sup> Days after completing the advanced training, detainee stated he met with UBL at UBL's house and informed UBL that detainee would continue to serve him just as detainee would serve the Prophet Muhammad. Detainee requested to go to the front lines, but UBL informed detainee he had a special mission for detainee outside of Afghanistan. Detainee decided to

---

<sup>9</sup> TD-314/50461-03, Analyst Note: Detainee identified it as the Arab Guesthouse, which is assessed to be the Hajji Habash Guesthouse.

<sup>10</sup> IIR 6 034 0804 03, Analyst Note: For additional information see IIR 6 034 0756 03, IIR 6 034 1200 03, IIR 6 034 0760 03, IIR 6 034 0911 02, and TD-314/50461-03. For additional links between the Hajji Habash Guesthouse and al-Faruq, see DAB Guesthouse Administration 14-Apr-2008.

<sup>11</sup> Analyst Note: In conflicting reporting, detainee stated he graduated on 15 March 2001.

<sup>12</sup> IIR 6 034 0752 03, IIR 6 034 0760 03

<sup>13</sup> IIR 6 034 1121 03, Analyst Note: Detainee stated he swore *bayat* to UBL on approximate 12 February 2001. Detainee also stated all students and individuals staying at the Kandahar Guesthouse had to pledge allegiance to UBL if they wanted to become a fighter. However, other reporting indicates that *bayat* was not mandatory. Detainee stated that he met foiled suicide shoe-bomber, Richard Reid, on approximately 12 February 2001. The timing of detainee's meeting with Reid on the same day detainee swore *bayat* to UBL, the timing of Reid's December 2001 suicide mission, and detainee's intended participation in an al-Qaida orchestrated mission in the US cast doubt on detainee's claims that he was not aware of the details of his own mission in the US.

<sup>14</sup> IIR 6 034 1196 03, IIR 6 034 0844 03, IIR 6 034 1270 03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000063DP (S)

travel to the front lines himself. Detainee left Kandahar on 1 May 2001 and arrived in Kabul, AF on 5 May 2001, remaining there for 10 days. On 15 May 2001, detainee arrived on the rear lines. Detainee spent his time traveling around the front lines and greeting other fighters. On 2 June 2001, detainee returned to a Kabul guesthouse and waited five days for transportation back to Kandahar.<sup>15</sup> Detainee again met with UBL approximately 22 June 2001 at UBL's house to tell him he was ready for his mission to the US.<sup>16</sup>

(S//NF) In Kandahar, detainee met with KU-10024 for the first time in approximately July 2001. KU-10024 instructed detainee to return to Saudi Arabia and obtain a new passport with visas for the US and United Kingdom (UK) in preparation for his mission. KU-10024 informed detainee to contact SA-10011 in the United Arab Emirates after obtaining the documents and then gave detainee \$5,000 or \$6,000 US. Detainee returned to Riyadh and obtained his passport and visas (one for the US and one for Germany) with the assistance of a Sudanese national named Khalid.<sup>17</sup> Using a predetermined code, detainee contacted KU-10024 and informed him of his success in obtaining updated travel documents.<sup>18</sup> Detainee then traveled to Dubai, AE and met with SA-10011 who arranged detainee's flight to the US. SA-10011 gave detainee \$4,000 US to courier to his contact in the US who was supposed to meet detainee at the airport upon his arrival. Detainee then traveled from Dubai via London, UK, to the Orlando International Airport on 4 August 2001.<sup>19</sup> Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials noted detainee did not possess a return ticket and was unable to satisfactorily answer questions, contradicting himself several times. INS subsequently denied detainee entry into the US. When he was deported, detainee returned to Dubai via London.<sup>20</sup> In Dubai, detainee called SA-10011 and informed him of his failure to gain US entry.<sup>21</sup> Detainee claimed he stayed in Dubai only a few days before departing for Afghanistan. SA-10011 instructed detainee to travel first to Karachi, Pakistan (PK) and contact KU-10024.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> >IIR 6 034 0846 03

<sup>16</sup> >IIR 6 034 0848 03, IIR 6 034 0752 03, Analyst Note: Normal travel between Kandahar and Kabul only takes about one day. For additional information on detainee's activities, see IIR 6 034 0844 03, IIR 6 034 1121 03, 000063 302 13-AUG-2003, and TD-314/50461-03.

<sup>17</sup> IIR 6 034 0752 03, IIR 6 034 1194 03, Analyst Note: Detainee stated he returned to Saudi Arabia on 15 May 2001, which conflicts with detainee's third meeting with UBL and the July 2001 meeting with KU-10024 in Karachi. Detainee is assessed to have returned to Saudi Arabia by July 2001, applied for, and received a two-year visa on 4 July 2001.

<sup>18</sup> IIR 6 034 1205 03

<sup>19</sup> IIR 6 034 0757 03

<sup>20</sup> IIR 6 034 0626 02, IIR 6 034 0661 02

<sup>21</sup> Analyst Note: Detainee stated he did not know his mission, the purpose for being sent to the US, or his contact in the US. Detainee indicated he would have completed any mission assigned to him upon going to the US. After returning to Dubai, someone with detainee's name and passport number applied for a US visa in Riyadh.

<sup>22</sup> IIR 6 034 0757 03, TD-314/50461-03, Analyst Note: For additional information see IIR 6 034 0759 03, 000063 302 13-AUG-2003, 911 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000063DP (S)

(S//NF) Upon arriving in Karachi, detainee went to Abu Shems' guesthouse and met with KU-10024.<sup>23</sup> KU-10024 asked detainee to return to Afghanistan to fight. Detainee returned to the Hajji Habash Guesthouse where he waited about two months for the opportunity to go to the front lines in Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup> Approximately 27 August 2001, detainee met privately with UBL at his house in Kandahar, requesting and receiving permission from UBL to travel to the front lines.<sup>25</sup> Detainee stated he visited KU-10024's house approximately 13 September 2001, during which he saw suspected "dirty-bomb" plotters Jose Padilla, ISN US0US-010008DP (US-10008); and Adnan al-Shukrijumma aka (Jafar al-Tayyar).<sup>26</sup> Detainee also reported UBL visited the Hajji Habash Guesthouse approximately 15 September 2001 and told the guests to defend Afghanistan against the infidel invaders, follow the *fatwas* issued by Saudi imams calling for holy war against foreign invaders, and to fight in the name of Allah.<sup>27</sup> Detainee then went to a guesthouse in Kabul approximately 6 October 2001. After the US bombing campaign began, detainee attempted to flee to Pakistan through Jalalabad, AF and Tora Bora, AF.<sup>28</sup> Approximately 25 November 2001, detainee saw UBL in Tora Bora giving a speech to the leaders and other fighters. UBL told them to remain strong in their commitment to fight, to obey the leaders, to help the Taliban, and that it was a grave mistake and taboo to leave before the fight was completed. Approximately 5 December 2001, UBL arrived unexpectedly at the cave in Tora Bora where detainee and his group were praying. UBL prayed with the group and gave a speech similar to the one the detainee had previously heard.<sup>29</sup>

## 5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Detainee was arrested traveling with 31 other Arab al-Qaida fighters referred to by US intelligence reporting as the "Dirty 30," many of which are assessed to be UBL bodyguards and other members of UBL's security detail.<sup>30</sup> Detainee stated his "prince" (a reference to UBL), directed him to go to Tora Bora.<sup>31</sup> The leader of detainee's group in Tora

---

<sup>23</sup> IIR 6 034 1194 03

<sup>24</sup> IIR 6 034 0759 03

<sup>25</sup> >IIR 6 034 0848 03

<sup>26</sup> IIR 6 034 0944 03, IIR 6 034 0844 03

<sup>27</sup> >IIR 6 034 0848 03

<sup>28</sup> IIR 6 034 0759 03

<sup>29</sup> IIR 6 034 0848 03, Analyst Note: For additional information see IIR 6 034 0849 03, IIR 6 034 1154 03, TD-314/50461-03, IIR 6 034 0845 03, IIR 6 034 1137 03, SA-RIY-040721-90007-61707-HT (Sayf al-Adl's Diary). Detainee stated he saw Ayman al-Zawahiri sitting next to UBL during a meeting in Tora Bora on the 15th day of Ramadan 2001 during the late afternoon. 15 Ramadan 2001 equates to 1 December 2001. It was likely during detainee's claimed 5 December 2001 encounter with UBL that he saw Zawahiri.

<sup>30</sup> IIR 6 034 0704 02, TD-314/50613-01, IIR 6 034 0780 02, 000042 302 16-MAR-2002, Bodyguard Profile INTSUM 23-OCT-2006

<sup>31</sup> >000063 302 13-AUG-2003

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000063DP (S)

Bora was Abd al-Qadus, who was later replaced by Ali Muhammad Abd al-Aziz al-Fakhri, aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), US9LY-000212DP (LY-212).<sup>32</sup> Shortly after detainee's last meeting with UBL, detainee departed Tora Bora with the group of Arabs en route to the Pakistani border. Ali Hamza Ahmad Sulayman al-Bahlul, ISN US9YM-000039DP (YM-039), led the group during their attempted escape.<sup>33</sup> At the Pakistani border, their guides informed the group to meet them on the other side of a distant field. When the group arrived, approximately 15 December 2001, Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps forces captured them and transferred detainee to US custody from Peshawar, PK on 27 December 2001.<sup>34</sup>

**b. (S) Property Held:** None

**c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO:** 13 February 2002

**d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO:** Detainee's file does not indicate why he was sent to JTF-GTMO; however, it is highly probable that his transfer was due to suspicions of detainee being a UBL bodyguard.

**6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account:** Detainee initially provided false statements to debriefers until he was presented with the documented evidence of his 2001 travel to the US. The detainee began providing a fairly accurate account of his activities and associates and a majority of the new information has been corroborated by other sources; however, there are likely key details and associates of intelligence value that he has omitted. In 2004, detainee became uncooperative and reverted back to his earlier cover stories. Despite his earlier acknowledgements of being a member of al-Qaida, swearing *bayat* to UBL and traveling to the US for jihad, detainee insisted he is innocent. It is assessed that by reverting to his original cover story and being uncooperative with interrogators, detainee is attempting to withhold potentially valuable information and expedite his release. Although publicly released records allege detainee was subject to harsh interrogation techniques in the early stages of detention, detainee's admission of involvement in UBL's special mission to the US appear to be true and are corroborated in reporting from other sources.

**7. (U) Detainee Threat:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

---

<sup>32</sup> >000063 SIR 17-MAY-2003

<sup>33</sup> 000063 MFR 14-APR-2003, Analyst Note: SA-039 is identified as Abu Anas al-Makki (variant al-Makki) in the report.

<sup>34</sup> TD-314/50490-01, TD-314/00845-02, DAB Association of Names to 195 Detainees 29-Dec-2006

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000063DP (S)

**b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:** *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would probably seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities at home and abroad. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has been mostly compliant with guard force personnel, but has attempted to assault guards or verbalized threats and other hostile acts on several occasions. He has admitted using a cover story and continues to withhold information of intelligence value. Detainee is an admitted member of al-Qaida who attempted to enter the US to participate in the 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee swore *bayat* to UBL and participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. He received basic and advanced training, has multiple ties to senior al-Qaida leadership, and resided in al-Qaida guesthouses.*

- (S//NF) Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who traveled to the US to participate in the 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee swore *bayat* to UBL.
  - (S//NF) Detainee met with UBL several times and formally swore *bayat* to him. UBL then selected detainee to participate in an al-Qaida mission in the US.<sup>35</sup> On 4 August 2001, detainee traveled to the US for this mission.<sup>36</sup> KU-10024 identified detainee as an intended hijacker for the 11 September 2001 attacks, and another detained senior al-Qaida member noted detainee understood the mission to be a suicide operation.<sup>37</sup> (Analyst Note: The US based al-Qaida commander of the 11 September 2001 attacks, Muhammad Atta, was reportedly at the Orlando Airport at the time of detainee's arrival and is suspected to be detainee's intended contact within the US.<sup>38</sup>)
  - (S//NF) UBL directed detainee to meet with KU-10024 regarding his US mission. Detainee met KU-10024 five times and spoke with him on the phone twice. KU-10024 provided detainee with instructions and additional training, facilitated his travel for his mission to the US and coordinated his meeting with 11 September 2001 financial coordinator, SA-10011.<sup>39</sup>
  - (S//NF) SA-10011 arranged detainee's travel to the US from Dubai and provided detainee with \$4,000 US to give to his contact in the US. (Analyst Note: Detainee has also stated KU-10024 provided him with between \$5,000 and \$6,000 US. The

<sup>35</sup> >IIR 6 034 0848 03, IIR 6 034 1121 03

<sup>36</sup> IIR 6 034 0757 03

<sup>37</sup> TD-314/08837-04, TD-314/26117-03, TD-314/17199-03, IIR 6 034 1194 03

<sup>38</sup> FBI CITE 1343-01968-235-0047, 911 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, Analyst Note: In IIR 6 034 0631 03, detainee reported contacting an individual named Abdallah Abd al-Aziz al-Sabur as his contact in Orlando. Detainee reported he was introduced to al-Sabur by telephone by an individual named Ahmad al-Masri who managed an automobile show room in Riyadh. Detainee later contacted al-Sabur on 2 August 2001 from Dubai. Detainee has since reported the automobile related reporting was a cover story.

<sup>39</sup> TD-314/26117-03, TD-314/17199-03, IIR 6 034 0844 03, IIR 6 034 1194 03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000063DP (S)

detainee likely had thousands of dollars, but the source, actual amount, intended use and disposition of the money remain in question.)<sup>40</sup>

- (S//NF) SA-10011 stated Muhammad Atta called him with instructions to make reservations and buy airline tickets to Orlando for five individuals including detainee.<sup>41</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee received computer training from al-Qaida member Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in preparation for his mission to the US.
  - (S//NF) Detainee stated while at Abu Shem's house in Karachi in July 2001, KU-10024 had al-Kuwaiti teach detainee to send email. KU-10024 informed detainee when someone went on a mission, he would need to know how to send messages and email was safer than talking on the phone. Al-Kuwaiti took detainee to a local internet cafe for his training.<sup>42</sup>
    - ◆ (S//NF) Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was a senior al-Qaida facilitator and subordinate of KU-10024. Al-Kuwaiti worked in the al-Qaida media house operated by KU-10024 in Kandahar and served as a courier.<sup>43</sup>
    - ◆ (S//NF) Al-Qaida facilitator Hassan Ghul stated al-Kuwaiti, Hamza al-Ghamdi and Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi traveled with UBL.<sup>44</sup> (Analyst Note: Al-Kuwaiti was seen in Tora Bora and it is possible al-Kuwaiti was one of the individuals detainee reported accompanying UBL in Tora Bora prior to UBL's disappearance.)
  - (S//NF) Detainee stated he was not very skilled in the use of email and al-Kuwaiti told KU-10024 it would be difficult for the detainee to fully understand computers or how to use the internet for the purpose of emailing. (Analyst Note: Detainee attended a computer course in Saudi Arabia and received a certificate upon graduating. It is doubtful detainee would not be able to grasp the concept and procedures necessary for internet email, especially with Arabic websites that offered the service. Detainee stated KU-10024 provided him with a code to use when he reported success obtaining his visa.)<sup>45</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in support of al-Qaida and the Taliban.
  - (S//NF) After the US bombing campaign began, detainee attempted to flee to Pakistan through Jalalabad, AF and Tora Bora, AF.<sup>46</sup> Approximately 25 November

---

<sup>40</sup> IIR 6 034 0757 03, TD-314/49648-05, IIR 6 034 1194 03

<sup>41</sup> TD-314/17916-04

<sup>42</sup> IIR 6 034 1194 03

<sup>43</sup> IIR 6 034 0226 05, TD-314/04398-05, TD-314/39130-02

<sup>44</sup> >TD-314/29012-04, TD-314/30205-04, Analyst Note: For additional information see TD-314/05730-05, IIR 6 034 0226 05, TD-314/45991-05, TD-314/63199-04, TD-314/04398-05, TD-314/56328-04, TD-314/55744-04, TD-314/49162-04, TD-314/45296-04, TD-314/24351-04, TD-314/04950-04, TD-314/39130-02, IIR 6 034 0760 03

<sup>45</sup> IIR 6 034 1194 03, 000063 SIR 30-MAY-2003, IIR 6 034 1205 03

<sup>46</sup> IIR 6 034 0759 03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000063DP (S)

- 2001, detainee saw UBL in Tora Bora giving a speech to the leaders and other fighters. UBL told them to remain strong in their commitment to fight, to obey the leaders and to help the Taliban, and that it was a grave mistake and taboo to leave before the fight was completed.<sup>47</sup> Detainee stated his group was the first to leave UBL's Tora Bora Mountain Complex and travel to Pakistan after UBL left them in mid-December 2001.<sup>48</sup>
- (S//NF) Prior to reporting to UBL that detainee was ready for his mission in the US, detainee reported visiting the front and rear lines at Kabul.<sup>49</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee admitted receiving basic training at the al-Qaida al-Faruq Training Camp and then attended advanced training at the Tarnak Farm Training Camp.<sup>50</sup>
    - (S//NF) Detainee stated Abdel Qadir Hussayn Ali al-Mudhaffari, ISN US9YM-000040DP (YM-040), was a trainer for a course at detainee's advanced training camp. YM-040 taught topography and weapons to all groups at the camp.<sup>51</sup>
    - (S//NF) Analyst Note: Detainee was chosen for the al-Qaida mission following completion of basic training. Detainee's advanced training was probably related to his expected duties in the US and served as a vetting period to ensure detainee's personality and motivation would carry him through the completion of the mission.
  - (S//NF) Detainee has multiple ties with other senior al-Qaida members and key operatives.
    - (S//NF) Detainee met UBL's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, on two occasions in Afghanistan. The first meeting occurred at the Hajji Habash Guesthouse when al-Zawahiri accompanied UBL and others who arrived to pray for the soul of a child who had died. The second meeting occurred on 15 December 2001, during a meeting with UBL in Tora Bora.<sup>52</sup> (Analyst Note: Al-Zawahiri was leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in Afghanistan before joining with UBL, at which time al-Zawahiri became al-Qaida's second-in-command. Detainee's placement in Tora Bora in December 2001 is indicative of participation in the hostilities against US and Coalition forces that occurred in that region during the period.)
    - (S//NF) Detainee claims he met al-Qaida military operations supreme commander, Sayf al-Adl on 24 April 2001.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>47</sup> IIR 6 034 0848 03, Analyst Note: For additional information see IIR 6 034 0849 03, IIR 6 034 1154 03, TD-314/50461-03, IIR 6 034 0845 03, IIR 6 034 1137 03, SA-RIY-040721-90007-61707-HT (Sayf al-Adl's Diary).

<sup>48</sup> 000063 SIR 14-APR-2003, IIR 6 034 0847 03, IIR 6 034 0704 02

<sup>49</sup> >IIR 6 034 0846 03

<sup>50</sup> IIR 6 034 0760 03, IIR 6 034 0752 03, IIR 6 034 1196 03, Analyst Note: For additional information see IIR 6 034 0803 03, IIR 6 034 1270 03, IIR 6 034 0760 03, IIR 6 034 0843 03, IIR 6 034 0891 03, IIR 6 034 0944 03, IIR 6 034 1121 03, 000063 302 13-AUG-2003, IIR 6 034 1153 03, IIR 6 034 1155 03, IIR 6 034 1179 03, IIR 6 034 1180 03, IIR 6 034 1184 03, IIR 6 034 1186 03, and IIR 6 034 0847 03.

<sup>51</sup> IIR 6 034 0847 03, TD-314/50507-03, 000063 SIR 05-MAY-2003

<sup>52</sup> IIR 6 034 1154 03, IIR 6 034 1137 03, Analyst Note: Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) merged with al-Qaida in June 2001.

<sup>53</sup> IIR 6 034 1155 03, IIR 6 034 0911 02, IIR 6 034 1154 03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000063DP (S)

- (S//NF) In addition to those already noted, detainee claimed he met the following senior al-Qaida members at the Hajji Habash Guesthouse in Kandahar: deceased military chief of al-Qaida Muhammad Atif, aka (Abu Hafs al-Masri); senior al-Qaida religious advisor Mahfouz Ould al-Walid, aka (Abu Hafs al-Mauritania); senior al-Qaida operative YM-10014; and al-Qaida spokesman Sulayman Abu Ghayth.<sup>54</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee met Abu Turab at KU-10024's guesthouse, which was under Abu Turab's management. Abu Turab supervised the training in close combat and "white" weapons for five of the pilots for 11 September 2001 attacks.<sup>55</sup> (Analyst Note: White weapons include easily obtained weapons such as knives and other weapons that do not require a propellant such as the gunpowder in a pistol's bullet.)
- (S//NF) Detainee also admitted seeing al-Qaida operatives US-10008, Jafar al-Tayar, convicted suicide terrorist Richard Reid, and Martin Mubanga, US9UK-010007DP (UK-10007, transferred). Detainee stated he saw US-10008 with Jafar al-Tayar each time detainee visited the KU-10024's guesthouse. (Analyst Note: US-10008 is a suspected dirty-bomb plotter targeting locations in the US. US-10008 was convicted on terrorism conspiracy charges. Detainee saw US-10008 and others working on computers at KU-10024's house and the media center operated by KU-10024. KU-10024's guesthouse may have served as the al-Qaida media center in Kandahar. Reid attempted to explode a shoe-bomb during a transatlantic flight in December 2001.)<sup>56</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee is associated with multiple UBL bodyguards to include Saghir, referred to as UBL's "doorman," and multiple JTF-GTMO detainees.<sup>57</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee is also associated with al-Qaida members who received explosives training from senior al-Qaida explosives expert Midhat Mursi al-Sayyid Umar, aka (Abu Khabab al-Masri). (Analyst Note: Detainee has reported on these individuals but may have other information relating to the training and use of explosives, as well as other explosives-trained individuals at large. Abu Khabab al-Masri was reportedly killed on 28 July 2008.)<sup>58</sup>

**c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee is assessed to be a **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 44 reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the

<sup>54</sup> IIR 6 034 1137 03, IIR 6 034 1152 03, IIR 6 034 1153 03, IIR 6 034 1179 03, IIR 6 034 1120 03

<sup>55</sup> IIR 6 034 1137 03, SA-RIY-040721-90007-61707-HT (Sayf al-Adl's Diary), IIR 6 034 0844 03

<sup>56</sup> IIR 6 034 1198 03, IIR 6 034 0905 03, IIR 6 034 0849 03, IIR 6 034 0844 03, IIR 6 034 0845 03, IIR 6 034 0944 03, IIR 6 034 1137 03

<sup>57</sup> IIR 6 034 1137 03, IIR 6 034 0847 03, 000063 SIR 17-APR-2003, TD-314/50507-03, Analyst Note: The other JTF-GTMO detainees include: US9YM-000029DP, US9YM-000031DP, US9YM-000037DP, US9YM-000039DP, US9YM-000041DP, US9SA-000042DP, US9YM-000044DP, US9YM-000045DP, US9SU-000054DP, US9SA-000059DP (transferred), and US9MO-000056DP (transferred).

<sup>58</sup> IIR 6 034 0906 03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000063DP (S)

most recent occurring on 09 June 2008, when he was reported passing food through the recreation yard fence. He has six reports of disciplinary infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 28 October 2005, when he was reported throwing a cup of feces on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of nine reports of disciplinary infraction and eight so far in 2008.

**8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 27 March 2007.

**b. (S//NF) Placement and Access:** Detainee had access to the inner circles of al-Qaida through his interactions with senior al-Qaida members including UBL, Zawahiri, KU-10024 and others. Detainee spent considerable time within al-Qaida operated facilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan to include training camps, guesthouses and the media facility. Detainee met several individuals directly linked to planned al-Qaida operations against the US. Detainee traveled internationally with al-Qaida's help on several occasions to include assistance directly from KU-10024 and 11 September 2001 financial manager, SA-10011.

**c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** Detainee can provide information on key al-Qaida figures due to his association and numerous meetings with them. Detainee's repeated association with other terrorist operatives may allow him to reveal additional information on planned operations targeting the US. Detainee has extensive knowledge of training programs and related intelligence for al-Qaida in Afghanistan, as well as al-Qaida military operations in Tora Bora. Detainee can provide information on al-Qaida's procurement of authentic and forged travel documents, financial activities and additional information on key personnel. Detainee can provide information on al-Qaida's use of the internet and advanced training tactics and techniques taught in al-Qaida camps. Detainee likely has information on al-Qaida's activities regarding the 11 September 2001 attacks which has not been divulged, such as other operatives who were unable, but intended, to participate.

**d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**

- Key al-Qaida members including:
  - UBL
  - Ayman Zawahiri
  - KU-10024 & SA-10011

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000063DP (S)

- Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti
- Abu Turab
- Al-Qaida members still at large
- Al-Qaida operations and facilities
  - 11 September 2001 planning, financing, and operations
  - Failed and planned attacks – shoe-bomb, dirty-bomb, other unfulfilled attacks
  - Al-Qaida training camps and guesthouses
  - Al-Qaida media center
    - Propaganda material
    - Personnel
  - Al-Qaida communications, use of the internet and codes
  - Recruitment and facilitation networks
  - International travel documentation
- Attempts to acquire WMD
- Saudi Arabia stability
- Terrorist and foreign fighters training and motivation
- Terrorism targets, activities, and related facilities

9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 5 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR  
Rear Admiral, US Navy  
Commanding

---

\* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.