



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330523

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

23 May 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000836DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Ayub Murshid Ali Salih
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Ayub Murshid Ali Salih, Ahmed, Akramah, Hamam, Safar, Salih Ayub Murshid Ali al-Usaabee
- Place of Birth: Dhamar, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 29 April 1978
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000836DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 4 September 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative who planned to participate in terrorist operations targeting US forces in Karachi, Pakistan (PK), and possibly inside the United States. Detainee was captured in a Pakistani raid in an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi, during which senior al-Qaida operative Hamza al-Zubayr was killed. A laptop computer recovered from the safe house, where detainee was captured, contained data that could be used to target aircraft for hijacking operations. Detainee admitted attending two al-Qaida training camps and staying at several al-Qaida guesthouses.

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330523

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Detainee is associated with a number of high-level al-Qaida operatives. **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Additional information on planned terrorist attacks against US forces in Karachi

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: After graduating in 1996 from Thowra High School, in al-Hudaydah, YM detainee worked with his father as an administrative assistant from 1996 to 2000 in the family grocery store.¹ Musab Omar Ali al-Mudwani, ISN US9YM-000839DP (YM-839) also attended Thowra High School.

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In June 2000, detainee met Abu Salih, a well-known, wealthy jihadist recruiter in his hometown of al-Hudaydah.² After detainee agreed to join jihad and train in Afghanistan (AF), Abu Salih bought him a plane ticket to Karachi, obtained a legal passport for him, and gave him 200 USD for incidental purchases. On 4 June 2000, detainee flew to Karachi via Dubai, United Arab Emirates (AE), with four other Yemenis. They stayed in a hotel for a week until moving to Quetta, PK and then across the border to Kandahar, AF where the group stayed in the Haji Habbash Guesthouse run by Abu Khaloud.³ According to passport, he left on 4 Jun 00.

¹ IIR 6 034 0370 03

² IIR 6 034 0370 03, Analyst Note: Abu Salih is assessed to be deceased al-Qaida recruiter, Abd al-Razzaq Salih al-Najjar, a close associate of al-Qaida facilitator Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-Hajj, aka ("Riyadh the Facilitator"), ISN PK9YM-001457DP (YM-1457).

³ 000836 KB 01-NOV-2002, IIR 6 034 0370 03, 000836 Passportb 29-APR-00, Analyst Note: Abu Khaloud is assessed to be the well-known al-Qaida facilitator and fighter Ibrahim Muhammad Abd al-Razzaq Ba Alawi. Variants of Khaloud include Khulud and Xlood.

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c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Abu Khaloud told the group to choose *kunyas* (aliases) and to never use their real names. Detainee decided to use the alias "Hamam." The Yemenis surrendered their passports, money, and personal belongings, and a week later were sent to al-Faruq Training Camp, where they trained during the months of July and August 2000. Detainee completed most of the basic training course. He received training on the AK-47 assault rifle, rocket propelled grenades, PK and RPK machine guns, Molotov cocktails, defensive and offensive grenades, topography, crawling, signals, and how to ignite 50 grams of TNT. Before completing his course, detainee contracted malaria and had to leave camp. Detainee returned to the Haji Habbash Guesthouse, where he spent the next month recovering. He then traveled to the Wazir Akbar Khan area of Kabul where he stayed at several guesthouses and attended a one month artillery training course at the Karghar Camp. After completing the course, detainee had an operation to have his appendix removed at the Wazir Akbar Khan Hospital in Kabul. After he had recuperated, he attended a month-long training course on first aid. After 11 September 2001, detainee fled Afghanistan and stayed in a number of safe houses in Pakistan and Iran while attempting to return to Yemen.⁴

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) On 11 September 2002, Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) officers, rangers, and police conducted raids against three suspected al-Qaida residences in two separate sections of Karachi. Detainee, along with several other Arabs who were in the apartment with him, resisted and fought a nearly three-hour firefight with Pakistani security forces that left two of the Arabs dead and five captured, along with several of Pakistani officials injured.⁵ The Arabs in the apartments were reportedly members of a special terrorist team deployed to attack targets in Karachi, including hotels frequented by US soldiers.⁶ Shortly after their arrest, detainee and his associates were turned over to US forces at the Karachi Airport and then transferred to Bagram, AF.⁷ In all, Pakistani forces detained ten individuals during three raids, including Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, ISN US9YM-010013DP (YM-10013); and Hassan Muhammad Ali Bin Attash, ISN PK9SA-001456DP (SA-1456).⁸

b. (S) Property Held:

- Clothing

⁴ IIR 6 034 0370 03, IIR 6 034 0577 03, 000836 KB 01-NOV-2002, 000836 302 29-OCT-2002

⁵ TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/37833-02, Analyst Note: Ten individuals were detainee in the three raids. Detainee's group was dubbed the "Karachi 6." See TD-314/36523-02 as well as the eight open source articles in JDIMS titled "Karachi 6 ..." for more information about the raids.

⁶ TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/36523-02, TD-314/37823-02

⁷ IIR 6 034 0370 03

⁸ TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/37833-02

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c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 28 October 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Training he received at al-Faruq Training Camp, as well as two other military courses he attended in Kabul
- Safe houses in Kandahar and Kabul, AF; Quetta, Lahore, and Karachi, PK; and Zahedan, Iranshahar, and Chahbahar, Iran (IR)
- Al-Qaida recruiter named Abu Ahmad and travel facilitator Abu Salih, who helped detainee enter Afghanistan

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: In early interviews, detainee gave a straightforward account of his travels and activities, including identifying extremist associates. However, detainee has admitted lying to debriefers on several occasions, and now his honesty is in question. Detainee has practiced counter-interrogation methods and has used medical conditions as reasons for non-compliance. Detainee has changed or forgotten details to his cover story.⁹ There is a significant amount of time for which detainee does not account, between when he completed training and when he fled Afghanistan.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative who planned to participate in an operation against US forces in Karachi, and possibly inside the United States. A laptop computer hard drive recovered from the safe house where detainee was residing contained data that could have been used in targeting aircraft and to support hijacking operations. Detainee admitted attending training at two al-Qaida-run training camps and staying at multiple al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee is associated with a number of high-level al-Qaida operatives.

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida. Detainee was captured in a firefight with Pakistani security forces and was identified as a Karachi al-Qaida cell member and a participant in planned terrorist attacks against US interests in Pakistan, and possibly in the United States.
 - (S//NF) Shawki Awad Balzuhair, ISN US9YM-000838DP (YM-838), who was captured with detainee, stated all of the six individuals living with Hamza al-Zubayr,

⁹ 000836 SIR 21-JAN-2003

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including detainee, were al-Qaida members. YM-838 said Hamza al-Zubayr was the group's al-Qaida operational leader, and that Anas al-Pakistani was the group's caretaker. YM-838 also said al-Zubayr formerly served as a senior military trainer at al-Faruq Camp.¹⁰

- ◆ (S//NF) Said Salih Said Nashir, ISN US9YM-000841DP (YM-841), lived in the same apartment as detainee and was captured in the same raid. YM-841 listed his roommates as detainee; YM-838; YM-839; Hail Aziz Ahmed al-Maythali, ISN US9YM-000840DP (YM-840); and Amar, who was killed during the firefight. YM-838 heard from others Amar used to be one of Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) bodyguards.¹¹ (Analyst Note: Amar is likely a reference to Ammar Abdallah Ali al-Dhalai, variant (Abu Ammar al-Dale), a UBL bodyguard.¹²)
- (S//NF) YM-838 stated Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash, aka (Khallad), aka (Silver), ISN US9YM-010014DP (YM-10014), who would visit the apartment roughly every two weeks, was the group's primary facilitator in Karachi and their link to senior people in al-Qaida. YM-838 claimed Ammar al-Baluchi, ISN US9PK-010018DP (PK-10018), also visited to bring money, clothing, and assistance. Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani, ISN US9PK-001461DP (PK-1461), who was well known to the group as a Karachi-based facilitator who previously transported many of them from other safe houses, also often visited.¹³
- (S//NF) According to a Pakistani government service, individuals located in two of the Karachi residences raided on 11 September 2002 were suspected of being part of a special terrorist team deployed to attack targets in Karachi.¹⁴
 - (S//NF) Among the papers found at the residence where detainee was captured was an undated letter addressed to Hamza al-Zubayr from an individual named Mukh.¹⁵ (Analyst Note: Mukh is a variant of the alias Mukhtar used by Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), aka (Mukhtar), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024)).
 - ◆ (S//NF) PK-1461, who is familiar with the coded terminology used by KU-10024, said the letter, addressed from KU-10024 to Hamza al-Zubayr, contained instructions for al-Zubayr to speed up the execution of a planned, coordinated terrorist attack on multiple targets, likely using poisons and remote detonators. PK-1461 added that the tone of the letter to al-Zubayr

¹⁰ TD-314/37833-02, IIR 6 034 0361 03, Analyst Note: Anas is an alias used by Pakistani national and safe house keeper Saif al-Rahman, who was captured with detainee in the raid and retained in Pakistani custody (see TD-314/37098-02).

¹¹ TD-314/37833-02

¹² 001453 SIR 22-NOV-2004, IIR 6 034 0059 05 paragraph 75

¹³ TD-314/37833-02

¹⁴ TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/36523-02

¹⁵ TD-314/37823-02, TD-314-12088-03

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- indicated that he was an operational leader in Karachi and was given responsibility of a big operational task.¹⁶
- (S//NF) KU-10024 admitted being the author of the letter, dubbed the “Perfume Letter,” and stated the attack was to take place using military grade explosives against two hotels that housed US troops. KU-10024 commented the operation was postponed because it was compromised when the Pakistani ISID raided al-Qaida residences tied to al-Zubayr’s cell in September 2002 and arrested a number of cell members.¹⁷ (Analyst Note: It is assessed KU-10024 is referring to the raids which resulted in al-Zubayr’s death and the capture of detainee, the rest of the Karachi 6, YM-1456, PK-1461, and Abd al-Rahim Gulam Rabbani, ISN US9PK-001460DP (PK-1460)
 - (S//NF) KU-10024 stated that in March 2002 al-Zubayr discussed conducting a car bomb attack against the "Midway Hotel" and "Airport Hotel," located in the immediate vicinity of the old airport in Karachi. The hotels were chosen as targets because they regularly housed large numbers of US troops. KU-10024 approved of the idea and agreed to fund it with \$30,000 US to purchase the two cars needed for the operation.¹⁸
 - (S//NF) KU-10024, stated al-Zubayr had identified two Yemeni operatives, Ammar al-Dalih and Hassan, aka (Mansur), who would serve as "martyrs" in the Karachi operation.¹⁹ (Analyst Note: Ammar al-Dalih, as noted above, was a probable UBL bodyguard).
 - ◆ (S//NF) Over 20 radio-type detonating devices were discovered in the Tariq Road safe house, which was one of the other residences raided the same day. The devices were built inside of black “Sega” videogame cartridges and were designed for remote activation through use of a cell phone.²⁰
 - (S//NF) Two laptop hard drives were recovered during the raids in which detainee was captured.²¹
 - (S//NF) The hard drives contained images of instrument approach charts for major US and European airfields, along with flight simulator software. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) analysts assessed that a hijacker could use the data on the hard drives to study the proper approach to a commercial airfield, helping disguise his intent to crash an aircraft into a building or facility at or near the airport. In addition, terrorists could use the charts and software on the hard

¹⁶ TD-314/41583-02, TD-314/39649-02

¹⁷ TD-314/17985-03

¹⁸ > TD-314/37098-02, TD-314-12088-03

¹⁹ > TD-314/37098-02, TD-314-12088-03

²⁰ > TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/40307-02

²¹ TD-314/37121-02, Analyst Note: Ayub Murshid Ali Salih, aka (Akramah), aka (Safar), refers to detainee.

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drive to study incoming aircraft patterns, assisting in targeting with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).²²

- ◆ (S//NF) YM-838 remarked that he remembered an occasion when PK-10018 visited the apartment in Karachi and asked detainee about the performance of a new laptop detainee had received. YM-838 commented detainee had just shown up with it one day, and both PK-10018, and al-Zubayr helped detainee learn how to operate it.²³
- ◆ (S//NF) In addition to the aviation chart data mentioned above, the laptop computer hard drive contained procedures for kidnapping; smuggling money, weapons, ammunition and personnel; lectures and essays on terrorist training, executions, assassinations, and guerrilla warfare; remote control and electronics training programs; Stinger anti-aircraft missile assembly instructions; and other al-Qaida affiliated documents and videos.²⁴
- (S//NF) Passports belonging to UBL's family were also recovered during joint coordinated raids on related safehouses in Karachi. The passports belong to UBL's family were seized at the Tariq Road safehouse.²⁵
- (S//NF) Detainee admitted attending multiple training courses, at least two of which were affiliated with al-Qaida.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted attending basic training at the al-Faruq Training Camp in July and August 2000.²⁶
 - (U) Detainee admitted attending a lecture on jihad given by Ayman al-Zawahiri at al-Faruq Training Camp. Detainee later saw al-Zawahiri at a mujahideen wedding outside of Kabul.²⁷
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted taking an artillery course at Karghar Camp, where his instructor was Abu Abdallah al-Yemeni.²⁸
 - (S//NF) Detainee claimed he also underwent military training at al-Faruq in March 2001.²⁹ (Analyst Note: Detainee possibly attended advanced or special training during this second trip to al-Faruq; however, since he also states in the same custodial interview that he arrived in Afghanistan in March 2001, it is assessed he is

²² Al-Qaidas' possible study of aircraft approach charts - 26-SEP-2003

²³ TD-314/37833-02

²⁴ TD-314/37121-02, TD-314/37833-02

²⁵ TD-314/37103-02, TD-314/40307-02, TD-314/37823-02, Karachi 6 Analysis Paper

²⁶ IIR 6 034 0370 03

²⁷ IIR 6 034 0309 03, IIR 6 034 0370 03, Analyst Note: In the late 1980s, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri emerged as leader of the Egyptian terrorist group Islamic Jihad. He later allied himself with UBL and ultimately merged Islamic Jihad with al-Qaida, becoming second-in-command of al-Qaida.

²⁸ IIR 6 034 0370 03, Analyst Note: Possibly referring to the Ghoraba Training Camp, aka (Abu Musab al-Suri Camp), located near Kabul. Ghoraba Camp taught electronic networking, including the preparation of remote-controlled explosive devices (see TD-314/21668-00). A variant of Ghoraba is Ghuraba.

²⁹ TD-314/37827-02

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- trying to revise his timeline to reflect a shorter amount of time than he actually spent in Afghanistan.)
- (S//NF) Detainee stated he received a month of first aid training at Abu Usama's house in Kabul.³⁰
 - (S//NF) Detainee stayed in multiple al-Qaida and Taliban affiliated guesthouses.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted staying at the al-Qaida affiliated Haji Habbash Guesthouse in Kandahar.³¹ (Analyst Note: The Haji Habash guesthouse was used primarily for Arabs awaiting training at al-Faruq. The guesthouse also served as a waypoint for recruits traveling north to Kabul. Other names for the Haji Habbash Guesthouse are the al-Ansar Guesthouse, the Abu Khulud Guesthouse, the Zubair Guesthouse, and the Suhaib Guesthouse.)
 - (S//NF) YM-1457 photo-identified detainee and reported detainee was at the Hamza al-Qaiti Guesthouse in Kabul when the US strikes against Afghanistan began. YM-1457 stated detainee escaped Afghanistan to Pakistan, where he initially stayed in a safe house belonging to Abd al-Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al-Nashiri, aka (Mullah Bilal), ISN US9SA-010015DP (SA-10015), and operated by YM-1457.³² (Analyst Note: Prominent al-Qaida jihadist, Hamza al-Qaiti, a leader in the fighting against the Northern Alliance, ran a guesthouse in Kabul.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee was associated with high-level al-Qaida operatives.³³
 - (S//NF) USS COLE bombing mastermind YM-10014 photo-identified detainee as using the alias Safar. YM-10014 remarked detainee, YM-838, Ammar, and YM-840 came to Karachi around the same time, three months prior to the 11 September 2002 raids, and lived together in the same apartment, next to the residence of Hamza al-Zubayr. YM-10014 claimed detainee was a new mujahid who arrived in Afghanistan a few months before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.³⁴
 - (S//NF) Al-Qaida facilitator PK-10018 photo-identified detainee as a Yemeni national named Safar. PK-10018 said detainee stayed in Hamza al-Zubayr's Guesthouse in Karachi. PK-10018 was aware that the Pakistani authorities arrested detainee on 11 September 2002 during a raid on the guesthouse. PK-10018 commented detainee and other Yemenis were planning to return to Yemen because the fighting in Afghanistan was not going well.

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and sometimes hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 52 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in

³⁰ IIR 6 034 0370 03, 000836 KB 01-NOV-2002

³¹ IIR 6 034 0370 03

³² TD-314/38078-02, paragraph C; Analyst Note: This TD incorrectly lists the individual running the safe house as Abu Zubayr al-Haili, vice Abu Hamza al-Zubayr.

³³ IIR 6 034 0361 03

³⁴ TD-314/38300-04, TD-314/58059-05

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DIMS with the most recent occurring on 14 March 2008, when he was reported failed to follow guard's instructions by passing food in the rec yard. He has three Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 19 December 2003, when he was reported throwing water on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 18 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and four so far in 2008.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 21 April 2008.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was identified as an al-Qaida member whose leader was al-Qaida operative Hamza al-Zubayr. Detainee was captured in a safe house in Karachi where plans for several terrorist attacks were located and likely discussed. Detainee reportedly used a computer in the safe house and may have been familiar with a flight simulator and data on US airports stored on it. Detainee attended militant training at two separate al-Qaida affiliated training camps and resided at various al-Qaida affiliated facilities. Detainee admitted being associated with multiple high-level al-Qaida members.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee should be able to provide additional information on recruiting practices and procedures in Yemen, recruitment and vetting procedures in Afghanistan, al-Qaida members who helped facilitate his movement to various countries, as well as his role as a member of a terrorist cell. In addition, YM-840 identified detainee as being the person who could possibly know what deceased al-Qaida operative, Hamza al-Zubayr, was planning regarding future attacks. Detainee may be able to provide details of al-Qaida planning for airplane hijackings attacks on US airfields. Detainee likely has knowledge of the high-level al-Qaida member persons he associated with, heard of, or saw while in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and Iran.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Detainee's role as a member of a terrorist group, in particular a group planning attacks in Karachi
- Al-Qaida plans for attacks in US airfields or aircraft
- Al-Qaida personnel, training, and operations

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- Guesthouses and safe houses throughout the region, as well as operations, recruitment, and escape and evasion tactics used by the Taliban and al-Qaida
- Islamic extremists in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iran, including recruiters and operatives
- Radicalization factors of terrorism
- Terrorist operations in the CENTCOM AOR
- Means of communications between terrorists, extremists, and their associated organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan

9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 3 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding