




**S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20311208**  
**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

8 December 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,  
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued  
Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-010014DP (S)

### **JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment**

**1. (S//NF) Personal Information:**

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Ba Attash al-Dini, Walid Muhammad Salih Ba Atash, Khaled Bin Attash, Khallad Bin Attash, Khalad, Khaled, Khallad, Saleh Saeed Muhammad Bin Yousaf, Silver, Tawfiq Bin Attash, Walid Ba Attash
- Place of Birth: Azan, Shabwah district, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 1978
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-010014DP



**2. (U//FOUO) Health:** Detainee is in good health.

**3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment:**

**a. (S) Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD).

**b. (S//NF) Executive Summary:** Detainee is a senior al-Qaida lieutenant and former bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden (UBL). Detainee swore Bayat, an oath of loyalty, to UBL. Detainee is also a veteran jihadist and a member of a family recognized for their Islamic

**CLASSIFIED BY:** MULTIPLE SOURCES  
**REASON:** E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)  
**DECLASSIFY ON:** 20311208

**S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20311208**

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-010014DP (S)

extremism. Detainee participated in the Tajikistan Jihad and fought against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan (AF). The detainee helped coordinate and acquire materials for the 12 October 2000 bombing of the USS COLE in Aden, YM. He also participated in casing security measures of US-based air carriers out of Southeast Asia for the intended Southeast Asia portion of the 11 September 2001 hijacking operations. After UBL canceled the detainee's portion of the mission, the detainee assisted Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (KSM),<sup>1</sup> and his nephew Ammar al-Baluchi,<sup>2</sup> in Pakistan (PK) to plan and coordinate the intended attack against Heathrow International Airport in London, United Kingdom (UK), as well as the Karachi Plot.<sup>3</sup> Detainee's former positions as a UBL bodyguard and senior al-Qaida lieutenant have provided him with the connections and training to be a future threat. JTF-GTMO has determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
- A **LOW** threat from a detention perspective.
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value.

#### **4. (S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events:**

**The following section is based on a consolidation of several accounts from various significant individuals in order to assemble a feasible timeline.**

**(S//NF) Prior History:** Detainee ran afoul of Saudi Arabian authorities (NFI) for using hashish as a young adult.<sup>4</sup> Detainee has nine brothers; four of which were active in jihad: Hassan Mohammed Ali Bin Attash, ISN PK9SA-001456DP (SA-1456), is currently detained at JTF-GTMO; Abd al-Aziz aka (Abdul Barah)<sup>5</sup> is detained in Yemen; Hussam aka (Mohanad),<sup>6</sup> was killed in Kabul, AF, while working with the Taliban; and Hussain was killed in Kandahar, AF, after 11 September 2001. Detainee's father was imprisoned in Saudi Arabia (NFI).<sup>7</sup>

**(S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** None noted

---

<sup>1</sup> Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, US9PK-010024DP (PK-10024)

<sup>2</sup> Ammar al-Baluchi, ISN US9PK-010018DP (PK-10018)

<sup>3</sup> Analyst Note: Karachi Plot was a plan to attack the US Consulate in Karachi, PK.

<sup>4</sup> IIR 6 034 0998 03

<sup>5</sup> Analyst Note: A variant of Abd al-Aziz is Gul Aziz. Variants of Abdul Barah are Abu Barah and Abu al-Bara.

<sup>6</sup> Analyst Note: A variant of Hussam is Hussan and a variant of Mohanad is Mohannad.

<sup>7</sup> 001456 FM40 07-JUN-2004, 001456 FM40 26-JUN-2004

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-010014DP (S)

**(S//NF) Training and Activities:** Detainee received encryption training in late 1999 while attending a terrorist operational training course.<sup>8</sup> Detainee then traveled to Tajikistan to participate in jihad.<sup>9</sup> In 1996, detainee returned to Afghanistan from Tajikistan.<sup>10</sup> In 1997, during a battle against the Northern Alliance, detainee lost a portion of his leg for which he traveled to Malaysia (MY) to be fitted with a prosthetic replacement. He returned to Malaysia again in 1999 to obtain a new, better fitting, replacement prosthetic. Also in 1999, detainee instructed a close combat course at Mes Aynak training camp, located near Kabul, AF, prior to the camp closing.<sup>11</sup> Detainee also attended a 10-14 day training course in Karachi, PK, where he learned basic English-language words and phrases, such as how to read the yellow pages and airline time tables, and how to use the internet to encode communications and make travel reservations.<sup>12</sup> Later, detainee traveled to Thailand (TH) via Hong Kong, China (CH), and cased US airline security in preparation of the attacks of 11 September 2001.<sup>13</sup> In December of 2001, detainee traveled to the Afghan/Pakistan border where he stayed in various tribal areas and small villages.

**5. (S//NF) Capture Information:**

**a. (S//NF) Pakistani authorities captured detainee and Ammar al Baluchi in Karachi, on 27 April 2003, the same day they were to receive explosives for an operation in Karachi.<sup>14</sup>**

- **(S) Property Held:** None

**b. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO:** 4 September 2006

**c. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO:** Detainee was transferred to JTF-GTMO to face prosecution for terrorist activities against the United States.

---

<sup>8</sup> TD-314/08809-04

<sup>9</sup> IIR 6 034 0998 03

<sup>10</sup> TD-314/29879-03

<sup>11</sup> TD-314/25862-05

<sup>12</sup> TD-314/08809-04

<sup>13</sup> TD-314/30453-03

<sup>14</sup> TD-314/52606-05

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-010014DP (S)

**6. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

**b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:** Detainee was a senior al-Qaida lieutenant and bodyguard for UBL, had ties to other senior al-Qaida personnel, and is a veteran jihadist. Detainee arranged for the procurement of explosives used in the bombing of the USS COLE and was to be a suicide hijacker for the cancelled Southeast Asia portion of the 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee conducted surveillance of security for US-based air carriers flying in the Southeast Asia region. Detainee had proposed and was involved in the operational planning for an attack against London's Heathrow International Airport. He was also the primary collaborator in a plot to attack US diplomatic and commercial interests in Karachi prior to his capture.

- (S//NF) Detainee served as a UBL bodyguard and supervisor of the UBL's security after his return from Tajikistan in 1996. Detainee elaborated on procedures for selecting bodyguards for UBL's personal security force. (Analyst Note: Being a security guard or personal bodyguard was a prestigious position and bodyguards had closer contact with UBL than other support personnel.<sup>15</sup>)
  - (S//NF) Ahmed Ould Abdel Aziz, ISN US9MR-000757DP (MR-757), identified detainee as the supervisor for UBL's bodyguards.<sup>16</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee said that UBL would often change the composition of his security detail and would rely on individuals, namely the detainee, to identify new bodyguards.<sup>17</sup>
  - (S//NF) Al-Qaida financial operative Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, ISN US9SA-010011DP (SA-10011), claimed that his relationship with detainee was not very close as they did not work together. SA-10011 explained that detainee was a bodyguard for UBL while he was in the media committee.<sup>18</sup>
  - (S//NF) Ahmed Muhammed Haza al-Darbi, ISN US9SA-00768DP (SA-768) stated that the detainee was with UBL all of the time as part of UBL's entourage; riding in a Toyota Hi-Lux double cab pickup truck.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>15</sup> IIR 6 034 0098 05, Analyst Note: Senior al-Qaida operational planner Khallad provided additional comments in TD-314/36120-03 on UBL bodyguards. See also DAB Bodyguard profile summary.

<sup>16</sup> IIR 6 034 0433 03, IIR 6 034 0307 03

<sup>17</sup> TD-314/36120-03

<sup>18</sup> TD-314/32334-03

<sup>19</sup> TD-314/37810-03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-010014DP (S)

- (S//NF) Since the early 1990's, detainee actively participated in jihad, fighting against individuals whom he believed were infidels.
  - (S//NF) Detainee's younger brother, SA-1456, told SA-768 that the detainee traveled to Afghanistan and received training at an al-Qaida training camp. SA-1456 also said that after training, detainee fought in Tajikistan and eventually returned to Afghanistan.<sup>20</sup>
  - (S//NF) Badr Abd al-Karim al-Sudayri aka (Zubair) identified the detainee as slim, with a light beard, and having an artificial leg. He also said that detainee went to Tajikistan for the purpose of taking part in the jihad against Russian forces.<sup>21</sup>
  - (S//NF) Azzam al-Makki, one of the alleged perpetrators of the bombing against the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, stated that toward the end of 1997, the detainee joined the Taliban forces and participated in combat against the Northern Alliance.<sup>22</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee stated that he swore bayat<sup>23</sup> to UBL after returning from Tajikistan. According to detainee, he was one of the very first to swear bayat to UBL after UBL returned to Afghanistan from Sudan. Detainee said swearing bayat to UBL was really a pledge or promise to UBL, as UBL is the emir of an organization.<sup>24</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee assisted in planning the 12 October 2000 attack on the USS COLE on 12 October 2000.<sup>25</sup> Detainee's involvement in the bombing of the USS COLE primarily involved acquiring the explosives used in the operation.<sup>26</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee stated that Hadi Muhammad Salih Ibada Dulqum al-Waili aka (Hadi Dulqum), a known al-Qaida weapons and explosives supplier detained by Yemeni authorities in March 2003, helped him acquire the explosives used in the attack on the USS COLE.<sup>27</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee said that when he was arrested in Yemen in the spring of 1999, he was held in the main Political Security Organization (PSO) jail in Sanaa, YM. Detainee said that he promised to inform PSO director Ghalib al-Qamish if he heard that anyone was planning an operation in Yemen. Detainee added that he technically

---

<sup>20</sup> IIR 6 034 0998 03

<sup>21</sup> TD-314/34080-02

<sup>22</sup> TD-314/34080-02

<sup>23</sup> Analyst Note: Bayat is an oath of allegiance to a perceived senior.

<sup>24</sup> TD-314/29879-03, TD-314/34116-03

<sup>25</sup> TD-314/06139-02

<sup>26</sup> Analyst Note: The USS COLE was the second US ship targeted by al-Qaida after the failed attempt on the USS THE SULLIVANS on 2 January 2000. The attack on the USS THE SULLIVANS failed due to the overloading of the attack vessel.

<sup>27</sup> TD-314/00363-04

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-010014DP (S)

did not lie to Qamish, even though he was planning the USS COLE attack at the time.<sup>28</sup>

- (S//NF) Detainee was arrested on the same day al-Nashiri<sup>29</sup> had begun transferring explosives from caches to safe houses along the Yemeni coast (NFI). Hearing of detainee's arrest, al-Nashiri fled to Afghanistan and informed UBL. After detainee returned to Afghanistan, he learned that UBL had sent a letter to the Yemeni Government demanding detainee's release in fear that the detainee might reveal the existence of the USS COLE plot.<sup>30</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee stated UBL wrote a letter on detainee's behalf in the spring of 1999, demanding that the government of Yemen release detainee from prison. Within a short time, he was released and within two weeks, he returned to Afghanistan.<sup>31</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee participated in the planning operations for 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee made a trip to Southeast Asia on US-based airlines, observing their security measures. The detainee was selected to be a hijacker for the Southeast Asia portion of 9/11 attacks before it was cancelled. The detainee received English language training from KSM including how to read flight schedules as well as cultural information on the United States.<sup>32</sup>
  - (S//NF) KSM said that detainee had extensive experience and familiarity with the region and arrived in Malaysia ahead of the others to conduct preliminary surveillance regarding flight procedures on US aircraft flying between Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Thailand. Upon completion of his surveillance, and with the realization that it may be difficult for Yemeni's to enter the US, detainee returned to Afghanistan, where he met with UBL and presented a proposal to conduct an operation in Southeast Asia.<sup>33</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee provided additional comments on planning for the 9/11 attacks. Detainee stated that he was in Asia during December 1999. Detainee clarified that after he completed his surveillance mission in Southeast Asia, he returned to Pakistan in approximately mid-January 2000. After returning, he discussed the results of his surveillance with KSM and UBL.<sup>34</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> TD-314/00881-04

<sup>29</sup> Analyst Note: Al-Nashiri is identifiable with Abd al Rahim Hussein Mohammed al Nashiri, aka (Mullah Bilal); ISN US9SA-010015DP.

<sup>30</sup> TD-314/44111-03

<sup>31</sup> TD-314/44111-03

<sup>32</sup> TD-314/08019-04

<sup>33</sup> TD-314/15659-03

<sup>34</sup> TD-314/08019-04

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-010014DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee commented that his flights throughout Southeast Asia were surveillance missions for the Southeast Asia part of the 9/11 operations. Detainee stated he flew first class on United Airlines flights from Bangkok, TH, to Hong Kong, and then returned first class on a second United Airlines flight from Hong Kong to Bangkok on 1 January 2001. Detainee stated that he and other al-Qaida operations planners believed that security measures were applied company wide, thus whatever information he obtained on United Airlines security measures would apply to all United Airlines flights throughout Southeast Asia.<sup>35</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee stated that most of the passengers in the first class cabin were US persons. Detainee stated he wanted to fly additional casing missions in Southeast Asia so he could fly on the upper deck of a 747 to observe the cockpit during flight.<sup>36</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee stated that, upon returning to Afghanistan from Malaysia in early 2000, he discussed his plans with UBL. UBL, on the other hand, wanted detainee to sit in the economy class section of a 747 on a flight between Bangkok and Hong Kong to find out how many US citizens were on a typical Southeast Asia flight on a US carrier. UBL was worried it would be mostly Southeast Asians in economy class, so UBL wanted to make sure most of the passengers were US persons, thus ensuring he would kill the largest number of US persons possible.<sup>37</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee did not know why UBL cancelled the Southeast Asia portion of the 9/11 operations. Detainee speculated that because the planning for the Southeast Asia portion was not moving as fast as the US portion, the hijacking plan in Southeast Asia was cancelled.<sup>38</sup>
- (S//NF) According to KSM, while planning for the 9/11 hijackings was still in the early stages, detainee was among those who were pre-selected as participants. Prior to leaving for the US, via Malaysia, detainee received basic information on ways to rent an apartment, popular restaurants, and how to read a phone book. KSM stated detainee was to be used as one of the “muscle men” on the aircraft.<sup>39</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee explained that his knowledge of the proposed attack against London's Heathrow International Airport was based on what he had learned after KSM's capture in March 2003 from al-Qaida co-conspirator Ammar al Baluchi, during a series of approximately four or five meetings in Karachi.<sup>40</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup> TD-314/23505-04

<sup>36</sup> TD 314 23505 04

<sup>37</sup> TD 314 23505 04

<sup>38</sup> TD 314 23505 04

<sup>39</sup> TD-314/15659-03


<sup>40</sup> TD-314/33338-03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-010014DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee stated that at the time of his arrest in April 2003, his intention was to target Tel Aviv, Israel, instead of Heathrow International airport. The plot was still just a thought in his mind and he had neither started any tangible steps toward planning for the operation, nor shared his idea with any other operatives. In addition, detainee stated he had not yet chosen specific targets within Tel Aviv. According to detainee, he first thought of using Tel Aviv as the target for a possible attack after hearing a broadcast by the Saudi Foreign Minister in late September 2001 questioning why mujahideen would attack the US and Muslim countries when they could attack Israel instead.<sup>41</sup>
- (S//NF) The Karachi Plot. Following KSM's arrest on 1 March 2003, Ammar al Baluchi and detainee began preparations to continue the Karachi Plot which called for simultaneous attacks on the US Consulate and American targets in residential and commercial areas.<sup>42</sup>
  - (S//NF) According to Ammar al Baluchi, detainee arrived in Karachi and joined him in planning for the Karachi plot.<sup>43</sup>
  - (S//NF) The Karachi Plot was un-successful due to the capture of Ammar al-Baluchi and detainee while attempting to acquire explosives for the operation.<sup>44</sup>

**c. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee detention threat level is assessed as LOW based on a DoD initial 90-day observation.

  
HARRY B. HARRIS, JR.  
Rear Admiral, US Navy  
Commanding

BG, US ARMY  
DEPUTY COMMANDER

---

<sup>41</sup> TD-314/38032-04

<sup>42</sup> TD-314/61768-03

<sup>43</sup> TD-314/52606-05

<sup>44</sup> TD-314/52606-05